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Abstract 
The purpose of the interdisciplinary Companion Modelling (ComMod) approach in renewable 
resource management is to facilitate collective learning, negotiation, and institutional innovation 
about concrete problems faced by rural communities. The objective of this communication is to 
present and to compare the effects of the ComMod approach on collective water management at 
three different pilot sites located in upper northern Thailand (two sites) and west-central Bhutan. 
At these sites, water management is a cross-cutting problem: the processes of agricultural 
commercialization and increased pressure on the land led to the need for stakeholders to agree on 
new rules for the management of limited water resources. In the Lingmuteychu watershed of 
Bhutan, water sharing at rice transplanting has been a perpetual issue, without a way forward, 
while in montane northern Thailand a looming water scarcity is linked to the increased demand 
from expanding irrigated horticultural cropping systems. 
The paper compares the way this approach was flexibly adapted and implemented at the three 
sites according to the local contexts. The main effects of the ComMod process at the three sites 
are then presented according to a common framework analysing the processes of collective 
learning, negotiation, and coordinated action that were stimulated. It emphasizes the following 
effects : learning about the current situation and awareness of a problem to be solved collectively, 
understanding each other’s perceptions and common agreement on the nature of the problem, 
exploration of new management rules to solve the problem, and concrete implementation of 
institutional innovation. The discussion focuses on the factors contributing to, or limiting, the 
achievement of institutional innovation. The role of the local institutional context and the 
possibility to establish inter-institutional dialogue among multiple levels of organization is 
highlighted. Finally, we point out the need for specific monitoring & evaluation procedures 
adapted to such a highly participatory and adaptive process. 
 
 
Introduction 
Purpose of the interdisciplinary Companion Modelling (ComMod) approach  
Companion modeling (ComMod) is an approach making use of simulation models in a 
participatory way to understand and facilitate the collective decision making process of 
stakeholders sharing a common resource (Bousquet et al. 2005). The principle is to identify the 
various points of view and subjective criteria to which the different stakeholders refer implicitly 
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or even unconsciously, and to integrate this knowledge into simulation models to be used within 
the context of platforms for collective learning. The different stakeholders, including researchers, 
aim at working out a common vision of the common resource management that highlights the 
diversity of interests and perceptions to take into account when setting up agreed upon indicators, 
shared monitoring procedures, and ultimately concrete action plans.  
Our higher-order development goal is to understand and to improve interactions between 
the social and ecological subsystems for resilient water management at the catchment scale. 
Holling (1978) and Ostrom (1994) have shown that resilience depends on the adaptive capacity of 
the system, and that it can be enhanced through better coordination among stakeholders. Such 
coordination is a necessary condition for the sustainability of livelihoods, social equity, and 
environmental integrity in mountainous regions.  
During the past three to four years, we have been using the innovative ComMod approach 
to examine different kinds of water management problems at two sites in montane upper northern 
Thailand and one location in west-central Bhutan. Our common objective is to develop 
methodologies to enhance adaptive management capacity of local communities. New knowledge 
acquired on stakeholders’ perceptions of water dynamics allows to pinpoint critical interactions 
between social and hydrological subsystems. These critical interactions provide key entry points 
for better stakeholder coordination and efficient use of limited water resources in these 
mountainous areas. 
 
Presentation of the three case studies : local context & water management problem 
The two highland catchments in upper northern Thailand are located in Mae Hae of Chiang Mai 
Province, and Mae Salaep of Chiang Rai Province In this region, small-scale poor minority 
farmers are being rapidly integrated into the market economy and their former agrarian system 
based on swiddening replaced by (semi-)permanent cash-crop based agriculture on steep slopes. 
The diversity of farmers (economic status, agricultural practices, etc.) is already extensive. An 
increasing number of individual or collective stakeholders with differing water-use strategies 
interact in the dynamics of this diversifying sloping-land agriculture, and there are more and 
more conflicts over the access to this key resource. In Mae Hae, the water management problem 
reinforced by a recent drought  involves people from several Hmong and Karen villages. 
Downstream farmers complain about the increasing share of water being captured by upstream 
vegetable growers and well-off farmers setting up irrigation pipes system further upstream. In 
Mae Salaep, tensions occur within the community as only a minority of relatively well-off farms 
have access to water to irrigate their lychee and tea plantations. This is due to the “first arrived 
first served” current rule that stipulates that once a farmer has set up irrigation pipes in a stream, 
other villagers cannot get water from the upstream section.  
The high altitude Lingmuteychu watershed in west-central Bhutan is drained by a stream 
that originates as a spring from a rock face at an altitude of 2400 m. It is totally a rainfed stream 
since the ranges that confine the watershed are below the snow line. 12 irrigation canals irrigate 
about 180 ha of terraced wetland belonging to six villages. These villages share irrigation water 
within a broadly respected customary regime evolved during a time when demands were lower. 
Under the current processes of market integration, decentralization, and environmental 
conservation policies, and changes in villagers’ social needs, the customary water-sharing rules 
are not adapted to current farming conditions anymore and are causing a repetitive social conflict 
every year as it remains unresolved. Under the national Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management (CB-NRM) policy, this watershed has already been selected as a pilot site to set up 
a coordinated network of water users’ groups.  
Recently, participatory modelling workshops, focusing on land-use changes and water 
management, and involving representatives from all categories of male and female farmers, were 
organized at these three sites to test the feasibility of the proposed ComMod methodology 
(Trebuil et al. 2002, Barnaud et al. 2005, Promburom et al. 2005, Raj Gurung et al. 2005) . 
The main objective of this communication is to present and to compare the effects and the 
impact of the ComMod approach on collective water management at these three different pilot 
sites. After a presentation of the principles of the Companion modelling approach, the paper 
compares the way this approach was flexibly adapted and implemented according to the local and 
research contexts. The main effects of the ComMod process at the three sites are then presented 
according to a common framework analysing the processes of collective learning, negotiation, 
and coordinated action that were stimulated. Finally, the discussion focuses on the factors 
contributing to, or limiting, the achievement of institutional innovation. The role of the local 
institutional context and the possibility to establish inter-institutional dialogue among multiple 
levels of organization will be highlighted, before concluding with a discussion of the challenging 
need to establish monitoring and evaluation procedures adapted to ComMod processes. 
 
Materials and methods 
The ComMod methodology combines the use of different tools such as multi-agent systems 
(MAS), geographical information systems (GIS), participatory mapping, and role-playing games 
(RPG). It has been tested and used in a dozen of case studies in five different Asia countries 
during the past four years (Bousquet et al. 2005), as well as in various institutional and cultural 
contexts around the world (Etienne et al. 2003, in Southern France, Dray et al. 2006 in South 
Pacific). 
Under the ComMod approach, models are used in a cyclic process made of three stages 
which can be repeated as many times as needed: (i) Review of existing knowledge about the 
problem to be examined and gap filling field studies to specify the questions to be addressed and 
to supply information and hypotheses for modelling; (ii) Modelling, i.e the conversion of  current 
knowledge into a formal tool to be used as a simulator (computer MAS model or Role Playing 
Game); and (iii) Simulations, conducted according to an experimental protocol, to challenge the 
initial understanding of the system and raise new questions for new field studies, etc (Bousquet et 
al., 2002).  
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Figure 1. The companion modelling cyclic and iterative process. 
Table 2 presents a description of the respective features of the ComMod process implemented in 
the three case studies. They all have in common this cyclical approach in which at the end of a 
cycle local stakeholders identify new questions or new challenges to be collectively examined in 
the next cycle. In Mae Hae and Mae Salaep, the initial questions addressed in the first cycles 
dealt with land-use and were not directly linked to water management. But in both experiments 
the participants requested to focus on problems related to water. In this paper, we make use of 
only the ComMod cycles that were then implemented to address water problems. In 
Lingmuteychu, the two cycles focused on water management but evolved from a negotiation 
between 2 villages to a process involving 7 villages and aiming at setting up a Watershed 
Management Committee (WMC). Both cycles are analysed in the paper.  
 
Two kinds of simulation tools were used in these three case studies: Multi-Agent Systems 
(MAS) and Role Playing Games (RPG). MAS are computer models that are particularly 
appropriate to represent and simulate complex natural resource management (NRM) problems 
because they focus on interactions among heterogeneous social agents and their common 
environment (Lansing et al., 1994). In the three case studies, MAS models were implemented by 
using the CORMAS platform (See http://cormas.cirad.fr) tailored to simulate NRM systems.  
According to Duke (1974), RPG is a mode of communication more capable than others to 
convey complexity as it allows multiple stakeholders to interactively apprehend the complex 
systems from which they are part. It triggers discussions among players and allows them to test 
alternate scenarios, but this quickly becomes very time consuming. To remove this constraint, a 
computer MAS model, very similar to the game in its rules and features, is far more time-efficient 
to run simulations of scenarios. This  association is possible because MAS and RPG have similar 
components: agents corresponding to roles, the spatial interface to the gaming board, the time 
step in a simulation to a game round, etc. (Barreteau et al., 2001).  
The characteristics and use of the RPG at each site are presented in table 3. In the three 
sites the objectives of the RPG were twofold : a better understanding of local stakeholders 
perceptions & decision making processes, and the facilitation of negotiation among them. But 
each RPG stresses more or less on one of these objectives. The objective of the 7 villages RPG in 
Lingmuteychu is even clearly oriented toward collective action, as it is a pilot site in a CNB-
NRM policy. Another difference among the three case studies is the distance between the game 
and reality. All RPG refer to a simplified but explicit reality. However, the chosen level of 
abstraction can be quite low like in Mae Salaep RPG (3D board representing a catchment, players 
planting & selling crops, setting up pipes systems, etc.), average like in Mae Hae with a quite 
abstract 2D gaming board, or very high like in the “7 villages” game in Lingmuteychu (players 
manipulating only water : no explicit crops, no money, etc.). The third main difference is the use 
of the MAS model. In Mae Salaep, the RPG and the MAS model were developed in parallel: the 
RPG played by local stakeholders was a way to “open the black box” of the model, i.e. to allow 
them to understand its structure and operation, and to give them a chance to validate, criticize, 
and improve it. Both RPG and MAS models could then be used with local stakeholders to explore 
possible scenarios. In Lingmuteychu and Mae Hae case studies, RPG was the main tool used to 
stimulate collective learning. The knowledge acquired during the gaming sessions (about 
stakeholders’ decision-making) was integrated in a MAS model built to explore more scenarios in 
the lab. 
 
Results 
The different effects of the ComMod approach at the 3 sites are presented in table 4 according to 
a common framework. This framework is adapted from an analysis of  processes of collective 
learning and negotiation process suggested by Leeuwis (2004). 
 
Learning about the current situation & awareness of a problem to be solved collectively 
According to Röling and Wagemakers (1998), such awareness is a prerequisite to get people 
involved in a collective learning process. The RPG efficiently increases this awareness as it puts 
players in the problematic situation that they face in reality In the three case studies, players 
spontaneously acted in the game like in reality and produced the rules posing problems. In Mae 
Hae and Lingmuteychu, farmers from the upstream villages applied the ancestral rule and took as 
much water as they needed without taking into account the needs of downstream villages, and in 
Mae Salaep, the wealthiest villagers rushed to buy and set up water pipes and did not allow other 
players to get water from the upstream section according to the “first arrived first served” rule. 
The type of experiential learning in which people can observe by themselves the feedbacks 
resulting from their actions is considered as one the most efficient way to learn (Kolb 1984). 
Leeuwis (2004) distinguishes between positive feedback, information that indicates that one is on 
the right track, and negative feedback indicating the existence of a problem. Such negative 
feedback was a starting point in the three experiments and stimulated participants willingness to 
solve the problem. Figure 2 presents the lessons learnt by the participants after two successive 
participatory workshops with the “2 villages game” in Lingmuteychu and it displays their 
increasing awareness of the problem of water sharing between the two communities.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Lessons learnt by the stakeholders in Lingmuteychu watershed after two participatory 
workshops conducted in May and December 2003. 
 
Understanding each other’s perceptions & common agreement on the nature of the 
problem 
In the three case studies, the RPG designed to integrate the main interacting dynamics and 
stakeholders allowed the players to get an overview of these various interacting dynamics that 
they do not have in their everyday life. At all sites, during individual interviews, participants 
repeatedly claimed that the most important thing they learnt from the game was related to other 
stakeholders’ situations, strategies and /or problems. Such a statement is quite surprising when 
this concerns people living in the same village. But as a village leader in Mae Salaep declared: 
“in everyday life every one has his/her own problems, people go to fields and don’t have such 
opportunities to think about other’s situations”. This is less surprising (but all the more crucial) in 
Lingmuteychu where, because of the old conflict opposing them, villagers from the two 
communities hardly want to speak to each other. The first challenge here was to gather people in 
the same room. Swapped roles between upstream and downstream villagers efficiently triggered 
such an exchange of perspectives. In Mae Hae, farmers usually communicate and find 
arrangements within small groups of neighbours, but they do not go and discuss with other 
farmers that are too far up or downstream. The game allowed up and downstream farmers using 
water from the same stream to have a better understanding of their interdependency.   
Such an understanding of each other’s perception of the problem facilitated discussions to 
formulate a common agreement on the nature of the problem. A particular interesting similarity 
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of this phase in the three cases is that participants did not directly (not openly at least2) spoke 
about the core problem. In the collective debriefing following the gaming session in 
Lingmuteychu for the “2 villages” game, the participants discussed a lot about exchange of 
labour, a feature that was missing in the game, but did not openly addressed the question of water 
sharing. In Mae Salaep, in the first collective debriefing, no one directly said that the “first 
arrived first served” rule was the reason why so many people could not access water, they said 
instead that the problem was “the lack of water” and emphasized the need for new infrastructures. 
In Mae Hae, they did not either directly address the question of water sharing but formulated the 
problem saying that farmers cultivated too much irrigated vegetables. This illustrates that 
accommodation of multiple interests is a process that is rarely achieved in one meeting and 
emphasizes the need for a continuous and iterative process.  
 
Identification and negotiation of new rules to solve the identified problem 
Collective agreement on the various perceptions expressed by stakeholders enrich the process of 
identification of solutions. The analysis of this phase in the 3 cases shows that it is not a 
straightforward process. In Mae Hae, the participants first suggested that “every one should lower 
his cultivated area” without fixing any rule, and realized later the need to set up such rules and 
agreed on “maximum 3 plots per farmer”. In Lingmuteychu, after the “2 villages” game, players 
suggested to change the ancestral rule towards a more equitable access to water, but they didn’t 
sign any agreement. Later on, because some powerful upstream villagers refused to change their 
current practices in the absence of this official document, they realized the need for a written 
agreement. Therefore, during the second game, they collectively decided to set up a Watershed 
Management Committee that was printed and signed by all participants.  
 
Such iterative and continuous process is also important to deal with power relations. 
According to Van Der Veen (2000), a particular attention to power relations is needed at this 
phase of collective selection of solutions, because at this stage, there is a risk that, even if people 
really exchanged their views before, most influential people speak first and impose their view. It 
is therefore important not to stop at the first so-called consensus that first emerges, because it 
often reflects the interest of the most powerful ones (Wollenberg, Anderson et al. 2001). In Mae 
Salaep, the Tambon Administrative Organisation (TAO) representative spontaneously acted as 
spokesman and tried to impose his idea of building a single large reservoir. Other villagers were 
reluctant for fear that it would benefit only a minority but they did not dare to say anything 
against him. It was important for the facilitator to wait a little, asks for other suggestions, and 
make people vote. All participants voted then for a second suggestion: to build small weirs on 
different streams and to share water in groups of households.   
 
Exploration of scenarios  
This phase of exploration of selected scenarios (with the game and /or the MAS model) also deals 
with experiential learning as participants can assess the impacts of their suggested solutions. In 
Lingmuteychu, an essential positive feedback was that upstream players could see that when they 
shared the water, they could maintain their incomes even if they used less water3. In Mae Hae, 
people first experimented a positive feedback when they saw the results of their collective rule, 
but it turned to a negative one in a following gaming session when they broke the “3 plot 
maximum per farmer” rule because of price incentives.  
 
                                                 
2
 Even if participants did not directly openly speak about the core problem, they probably had this core problem in 
mind and refer to it in their discussions, but an external observer, even if well aware of the situation in the village, 
might not notice all these references.  
3
 The calibration of agro-ecological features in the game was based on results from on-farm experiments conducted 
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The test of a solution often raises new discussions. This aspect was crucial in Mae Salaep’ 
experiment and illustrates once more the importance of iterative processes. The test of the “small 
weirs” scenario in the second gaming session made players discuss about the rules to allocate 
water among the beneficiaries. It is only at this stage that participants started to discuss about the 
core but delicate problem of allocation rules. The suggestion to set up small weirs and to discuss 
rules among households was an indirect way to put into question the current “first arrived first 
served rule”. As a villager leader explained: “the only way to change the rule is to build a 
collective infrastructure that forces people to discuss and set up new rules.”   
 
Implementation of solutions 
In Mae Hae and Mae Salaep, the ComMod process stimulated a collective learning and 
negotiation process. Participants were highly willing to set up collective action, but the new rules 
were not implemented yet as they require the support of key institutions at a higher level in the 
administrative hierarchy. In Lingmuteychu, the second “7 villages” game implemented in May 
2005 led to a formal agreement to set up a Watershed Management Committee (WMC). Later on, 
the bylaws of this WMC were developed and village representatives selected. In December 2005, 
the WMC was formally established and the first concrete action plan initiated.  
 
Discussion : ComMod and institutional innovation 
From questioning ancestral rules to setting up agreement on new rules and then obtaining signed 
agreements, institutional innovation is a long and enduring process. It seems that in 
Lingmuteychu the collective learning and negotiation processes stimulated by ComMod was 
helpful to achieve such institutional innovation. But the limited impacts of the same kind of 
processes in Mae Hae and Mae Salaep so far let us think that some institutional contexts are more 
favourable than others. Ostrom (1994) emphasizes the importance of coordination among 
stakeholders at different levels of organization for resilient institutional innovation. This raises 
two types of interrelated problems that will be analysed in this section: the problems related to 
coordination among the various local water users at the community level, and the problems 
related to dialogue between the communities and the higher levels of organization.  
 
The first difficulty in institutional innovation is how to reach an agreement among 
heterogeneous water users at the local level within and among communities? In Mae Hae where 
several villages were involved, the players rapidly broke the rules they had set up. Upstream 
villagers probably considered their individual interests were more important than the preservation 
of their relationships with the lowland villages. But even within a community, collective 
agreement is not an easy task, because of the existing power relations and the unequal ability of 
villagers to stick to their interest. A particular attention to these aspects was drawn in Mae Salaep 
experiment, where there is a gap between an Akha woman who cannot speak Thai and never 
went out of her village, and a TAO representative used to negotiations. The problem of unequal 
ability to participate was solved to a certain extent and the less influential people could influence 
the process. But there is still a risk that at the very end the TAO representative sets up the project 
according to his own interest. And because he has the power to allow some of the villagers to get 
more benefits than others, villagers will not dare say anything for fear that they will not get these 
benefits. This problem is related to the crucial question of accountability of representatives 
towards communities that is particularly relevant when dealing with dialogue with higher 
institutional levels (Ribot 2001).   
 
The second level of difficulty faced when stimulating institutional innovation is how to set 
up dialogue with higher institutional levels? Such a dialogue is needed because community 
institutions are embedded in a broader institutional level. Community institutions have to be 
recognized by authorities, and may need their support to implement new rules. In 
Lingmuteychu’s case study, it was only when the WMC was formally recognized and its bylaws 
signed that the implementation of its first action plan started. The introduction of such a dialogue 
between communities and institutions at higher levels should be progressive. There is indeed a 
risk that the presence of officials too early in the ComMod process put discussions among 
villagers to a standstill. But this is not the only factor to take into account. In Mae Salaep case 
study, we set up a dialogue with TAO only when villagers felt sufficiently confident and 
requested the presence of TAO. But then we faced another problem: despite numerous discourses 
about the importance of villagers’ participation in previous interviews, the TAO chair adopted a 
paternalist and top-down attitude during the workshop and the ComMod process failed to 
generate a genuine bottom-up dialogue. The main lesson from this was the need for a better initial 
analysis of these higher level institutions, in particular their perception of the suggested ComMod 
process and degree of willingness to participate in it. An important factor explaining the 
successful institutional innovation process in Buthan was the occurrence of the ComMod process 
when a new water policy to decentralize management was being prepared at the government 
level. The fact that the institutional context was evolving at that level supported institutional 
innovation in the field. Despite a process of decentralization initiated in 1994, this was not the 
case at the other two Thai sites.  
 
Conclusion 
The comparative approach adopted in this paper highlighted the flexibility of the ComMod 
approach to promote adaptive water management in different contexts, the importance of the 
continuous and iterative characteristic of the approach to facilitate collective learning and 
negotiation, and the need for the support from higher level institutions to achieve institutional 
innovation at the community level. Facilitation of institutional innovation requests collective 
learning and negotiation not only at the local level of communities, but also with higher levels of 
organization. One of the challenges is to ensure that the diversity of interests and perceptions at 
the community level are taken into account when dealing with these institutions at higher level. 
This calls another broader challenge : how to measure this? How to measure the learning effects 
and the impacts of ComMod? There is a need to develop monitoring and evaluation procedures 
adapted to such highly participatory and adaptive processes.  
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Table 1. Main characteristics of the agricultural systems at the three sites in Bhutan and northern Thailand. 
 
Case study Lingmuteychu / Bhutan Mae Hae / Chiang Mai Mae Salaep / Chiang Rai 
Type of 
agroecosystem 
- Highland rice-based production system on 
terraces with potato as new cash crop, 
- Elevation: 1300-2050 m, 
- Area: 34 km2, 
- Forest cover: 69% 
- Sloping uplands, 3 sub-watersheds with 
(semi-) permanent production of cash crops,  
- Elevation : 980-1,630 m,  
- Area : 32 km2 
- Forest cover: 70 % 
 
- Advanced transition from shifting cultivation 
to permanent farming of annual & perennial 
cash crops on steep uplands, 
- Elevation: 500-850m,  
- Area: 3,69 km2 
- Regenerating forest cover: 7 % 
Population - 7 villages : Ngalong (western Bhutan 
people) and resettled Sarchop (east Bhutan), 
6 and 1 villages respectively, 
- Total population:1,200 
- Density: 35 hab/km2 (total area) 
- 14 villages: Hmongs and Karen, 251 and 
299 households resp.,  
- Total population: 2,985 
- Density: 91 hab/km2 (total area), 299 
hab/km2 (farm land area)  
- 1 village made of 2 hamlets : Akha people (1 
hamlet converted to Christianity)    
- Total population: 590   
- Density: 160 hab/km2 (total area), 194 
hab/km2 (farm land area).   
Agricultural 
productions 
Rice, potato, wheat, mustard, maize, 
vegetables. 
Rice, lettuce, cabbage, parsley, zukini, leek, 
persimmon, asian pear. 
Maize, upland rice, lychee, Assam tea, Oolong 
tea. 
Farm size (Ha) 0.5 – 2.0 2.1 – 3.2 0.8 – 11.2 
Land/labour(Ha)  0.2 to 1.0 0.7 (average) 0.4 to 3.2 
Off-farm income 
(% total income) 
Moderately high (25%) Average (17%) Very high (> 50%) 
Main ecological 
constraints 
- Shortage of irrigation water for rice 
transplanting in June-July, 
- Weed control in rice. 
- Soil erosion on steep slopes, soil nutrient 
degradation & water shortage due to 
intensive vegetable production. 
- Soil erosion on steep slopes, 
- Shortage of water in dry season for irrigation 
of plantation crops (lychee, Oolong tea). 
Main ecological 
opportunity 
- Potential for local varieties of red rice, 
- Potato as winter cash crop (double 
cropping). 
- Potential for improved irrigation in 2 out of 
3 sub-watersheds,  
-Water availability allows production of 
vegetables & fruit (persimmon). 
- Potential for perennial crops (Assam & 
Oolong tea, lychee)  
- Oolong tea & lychee yields & product quality 
can be high if water is available.  
Main 
socioeconomic 
constraint 
- Stringent traditional water sharing system, 
- Villages under 3 different districts, 
- Price fluctuations (fruits & vegetables) 
- Large and diverse communities, 14 villages, 
3 sub-district. 
- Unequal capacity to invest in perennial crops 
& irrigation facilities among farmers, 
- Price fluctuations for lychee. 
Main 
socioeconomic 
opportunity 
- Pilot site for coordinated water users 
network under CB-NRM policy. 
- Market for potato cash crop. 
- Support from The Royal Project Foundation 
to market products, 
- Numerous research & development 
projects.  
- Support from local development agency to 
introduce perennial crops, 
- Off-farm employment opportunities in 
Taiwan. 
Type of water 
management 
problem 
- Shortage of water in dry season,  
- Unequal access to irrigation water : 
problem of sharing among irrigators within 
villages (social status) & among villages 
(up/downstream location) 
- Shortage of water in dry season,  
- Unequal access to irrigation water : problem 
of sharing among irrigators (up/downstream 
location, priority to farmers with pipe 
systems)  
- Shortage of water in dry season, 
- Unequal access to irrigation water : problem of 
access to the stream (10 % only of irrigators : 
well-off farmers arrived first to set up water 
pipes, access forbidden to other villagers)  
 
Table 2. Characteristics of the companion modelling approach implemented at each of the three sites. 
 
Case study Lingmuteychu / Bhutan Mae Hae / Chiang Mai Mae Salaep / Chiang Rai 
Main 
iterative 
phases 
(this paper 
focuses on 
cycles related 
to water)  
- 1st cycle: with 2 upper villages to mitigate an 
old down stream - upstream water sharing 
conflict (2003, 2 months)  
- 2nd cycle: based on earlier positive results 
involving all the villages and focusing on water 
management at the whole watershed scale 
(2005, 2 months) 
- 1st cycle land & forest management (2004, 5 
months) : scenario visioning with participants 
highlighted water issue 
- 2nd cycle on water problem (2005, 5 months) 
- 1st cycle on soil erosion risk & crop 
diversification (2002, 3 months)  
- 2nd cycle on access to credit to expand non  
erosive perennial crops (2004, 5 months) : need 
to address problem of water to irrigate these 
perennial crops  
- 3rd cycle on water problem (2005, 8 months) 
ComMod 
sequence of 
activities 
(for cycles 
focusing on 
water) 
- Initial discussions with different stakeholders, 
farmers. Followed for both cycles by secondary 
data analysis & gathering of additional data by 
structured survey, conceptualization of role-
playing games, participatory gaming 
workshops, plenary discussion on rules for 
resource management, monitoring of effects.  
- Preliminary analysis diagnostic. 
- Water cycle: interviews of water users to 
understand current water use & management, 
conception and implementation of the Role 
Playing Game (RPG) with local officials as 
observers, collective discussion after the game 
(including officials) 
- Water cycle: surveys on local water dynamics, 
conception of RPG and MAS, gaming sessions 
to validate the model and stimulate discussions, 
adjustment of MAS model, participatory MAS 
simulations of scenarios, monitoring of effects, 
MAS simulations within small groups of 
villagers to accompany evolution of discussions. 
Institutional 
context of 
water 
management   
- New water policy charter to decentralize water 
management prepared at the government level 
- An old water sharing conflicts between 
downstream and upstream villages  
- Conflict reinforced by the recent adoption of 
potato as a cash crop in the upper village 
(double cropping) 
- Multiple stakeholders: 4 types of farmers, 
district officers, researchers. 
- Market-driven intensive horticultural 
production, increasing demand on water : 
conflicts between up and downstream villages, 
unequal access to water  
- Multiple stakeholders : Royal Forestry 
Department, Royal Project Foundation, Land 
Development Department, Sub-district 
Administration Organization, heterogeneous 
farming communities (Hmong & Karen 
people), researchers. 
- Expansion of irrigated perennial crops (lychee, 
Oolong tea) & increasing demand on water : 
tensions within the community (“first arrived 
first served” rule) 
- Villagers request a dialogue with local 
Subdistrict Administration Organization (TAO) 
that could finance water facilities      
- Multiple stakeholders : 3 types of farmers, 
TAO president & members, researchers.  
Origin of the 
demand / 
legitimacy 
of the 
approach 
- Villages have been going to the courts for 
many years to settle their conflict but the 
traditional law is ineffective,  
- RNR Researchers decided to propose an 
innovative approach to reach an agreement. 
- Demand from local university & development 
agencies following previous field research at 
this site on land degradation and food security 
aspects. 
- Water scarcity topic adopted after a long 
drought (2003-2004) & scenario visioning with 
players 
- Process initiated by researchers on soil erosion 
(after field research on this topic)  
- Increasing legitimacy along the process : 
players selected water issue & researchers re-
designed the models accordingly.   
Promotion 
of the 
approach 
Local agricultural research agency (RNRRC, 
Bajo) funded by a European Union Project, with 
support from CIRAD. 
Chiang Mai University research team funded 
by The Ford Foundation with support from 
CIRAD. 
 
Researchers from Chiang Mai University, 
CIRAD & Paris X University, with a local 
development agency.  
 
 
Table 3. Use of role-playing games (RPG) in the companion modelling approach implemented at each of the three sites. 
 
Case study Lingmuteychu / Bhutan Mae Hae / Chiang Mai Mae Salaep / Chiang Rai 
Key question examined 
in the RPG  
Is there a way to solve the inter-village conflict in 
irrigation water sharing? 
How do stakeholders behave & interact when 
facing varying levels of water scarcity & price 
fluctuations? 
Which collective agreements could reduce 
tensions due to water shortage and unequal 
access to irrigation in the village?    
Main objectives of the 
RPG  
- To promote a common understanding of the problem 
& facilitate negotiation, 
- To encourage collective action in the field of water 
management. 
- To verify water use & related practices by 
observing individual & group actions facing 
water shortages & price fluctuations,  
-To facilitate negotiation. 
- To stimulate exchanges of viewpoints 
between researchers & local stakeholders,  
- To facilitate negotiation among farming 
households & with sub-district officials. 
Conception of the RPG - Led by researchers from RNRRC, Bajo 
- Method : surveys & analysis of resource-actors 
interactions formalized in UML diagrams 
- Led by Thai PhD student, Chiang Mai Univ. 
- Method : co-construction among researchers 
of UML diagrams representing results from 
surveys  
- Led by French PhD student, Paris X Univ. 
- Method : back and forth between field survey 
(agrarian system analysis) & UML formalism 
Distance between the 
RPG and reality : level of 
abstraction & calibration 
- Game “2 villages”: high level of abstraction : 2D 
playing board, spatial distribution of land based on 
farm types, players manipulate crops, water cards, 
money, labour. 
- Game “7 villages”: very high level of abstraction : 2D 
playing board, players manipulate only water 
- Calibration realistic but use proportions (farm size, 
frequency of each farm type, etc.) 
- High level of abstraction: simple 2D board, 
farm plots allocated top-, mid- or downstream, 
number & location of plots depends on farm 
types, players manipulate crops & money, and 
have to deal with random fluctuations of price 
& precipitations.  
- Water availability calibrated to create 
resource scarcity situation similar to reality 
- Average level of abstraction: 3D playing 
board representing a catchment with rivers (but 
not their real catchment), number, size & 
location of plots depends on farm types, players 
manipulate water pipes, crops, money, labour 
force, off-farm cards. 
- Calibration realistic, with an attention to 
create resource scarcity similar to reality  
Rules of interactions 
among players  
- In both games, 3 gaming sessions played with 
different modes of communication: intra-village, inter-
village & swapped roles   
- Interactions among players were set free. 
- Swapped roles between dow & upstream 
players in the afternoon gaming session. 
- Interactions among players were set free, 
- No swapped roles. 
 
Who facilitated the 
RPG?  
Researchers from RNRRC, Bajo assisted by local 
development officers. 
Thai Ph.D. student assisted by 3-4 university 
students and one local assistant. 
Team : French Ph.D. student & Thai 
researchers, assisted by university students. 
Role of the facilitating 
team 
Mobilize the participants, explain rules & allocate roles, distribute information, maintain gaming atmosphere, manage unexpected behaviour, manage 
modifications of rules if needed (players invited to suggest rules modification), control time, pay attention to power relations & full participation, facilitate 
discussions. 
Analysis of the gaming 
sessions  
Collective debriefing just after the game to get feed back from the players, individual interviews conducted the day after the gaming session to assess the 
RPG and to better understand the reasons behind the players’ actions, players’ actions during the game plotted on Excel histograms, analysis of individual 
and collective behaviours based on observations and video recording. 
Relation between MAS 
model and RPG 
- Knowledge acquired during the 1st game used to 
conceive a MAS model (quite similar to the game) 
- MAS model built mainly for academic purpose : 
exploration of simulations in the lab 
- Knowledge acquired during the game is being 
used to develop a MAS model (more complex 
and comprehensive than the game, linked to a 
GIS)   
- a MAS model, very similar to the game, was 
built in parallel with the RPG.  
- RPG “opens the black box” of the MAS.  
- Participatory MAS simulations to explore 
more scenarios (3rd day of the workshop)   
After the gaming 
workshop  
- Monitoring (of effects) system in place for 6 months 
after the 2nd game only.  
- Perspective : out-scaling in another watershed 
decided by the RNRRC research team. 
Perspective : to develop a MAS model to be 
used in meetings of local & official actors for 
scenario exploration and negotiation. 
- 3 weeks & 3 months later : interviews to 
monitor effects & MAS simulations with small 
groups to discuss water management rules, 
- Perspectives: transfer of the game to local 
stakeholders if motivated.   
 
 Table 4. Effects of the companion modelling approach on collective learning and stakeholders’ behaviour at each of the three sites. 
 
Case study Lingmuteychu / Bhutan Mae Hae / Chiang Mai Mae Salaep / Chiang Rai 
Understanding of the current 
situation  & awareness of the 
problem to be solved 
collectively  
 
- The 1st game highlighted that 
traditional intra-village water 
management rules led to inequitable 
share and underutilization of water.  
- In the 2nd game, the effects of a 
collective versus individual mode of 
water management were understood. 
In the first two game rounds, all players 
could observe that there was not enough 
water, and that players downstream had 
crop failure & low incomes because 
upstream players had a priority access to 
water. 
The first gaming session highlighted 
current conflicts due to the “first arrived 
first served rule” : the first well well-off 
farmers who installed their pipes did not 
allow others to get water from the 
upstream section.  
Understanding other parties 
perceptions & common 
agreement on the nature and 
causes of the resource 
management problem  
 
- In both games, 3 gaming sessions 
played with different modes of 
communication: intra-village, inter-
village & swapped roles   
- Swapping roles between the upstream 
and downstream villages allowed actors 
to better understand the perception of 
other stakeholders. 
- Players realized the high number of 
farmers using water from the same 
stream and their interdependency. 
- Since down stream players could not 
solve problem individually or among 
small water user group, they requested a 
discussion with the whole group.  
- Players without water could see that 
many villagers had the same problem & 
they could think about it collectively.  
- But the “first arrived first served rule” 
was not openly put into question.  
- Discussion & summary by the TAO 
member: “problem is the lack of water”. 
Identification and discussion of 
new rules to solve the problem 
- 1st game: firstly, discussions about 
exchange of labour, then new rule for 
allocating water agreed upon, but later 
rejected by the upper village because no 
official document was signed! 
- 2nd game: collective discussion led to a 
formal agreement to set up a Watershed 
Management Committee (WMC)  
- 1st suggestion: all players should 
reduce their cultivated area. But without 
rule, the problem remains. 
- 2nd suggestion: to set up the rule 
“maximum three plots per farmer”. 
- 1st suggestion (TAO member): one 
reservoir for the village. Idea rejected by 
others for fear that it would benefit only 
a minority. 
- 2nd suggestion (Christian leader): small 
weirs & water sharing among groups of 
households. Idea accepted after voting.  
Exploration of scenarios to 
solve the problem  
  
- New collective management rules 
tested in the game : payers realized that 
a collective water management would 
minimize the amount of unused water & 
bring economic benefits. 
- The agreed ruled was implemented in 
the game and solved the problem.  
- However, stable good price stimulated 
players to increase production, then the 
problem re-occurred. 
- Weirs scenario tested in the game.  
- MAS simulations to explore the rules 
to allocate water among the beneficiaries 
of the weir (equal or proportional to 
plantations size?)  
Implementation of the selected 
new rules & community 
mobilization 
- Bylaws of WMC developed in late 
2005 & village representatives selected. 
- WMC formally established in 
December 2005 & implementation of the 
first concrete action plan initiated. 
- Participants & officials all wished the 
collective action become true, but the 
rule has not been implemented yet.  
- Some expressed that “we could discuss 
but rich people may not agree”.  
- A project to request fund to TAO for 
water facilities is under preparation.  
- But there is a risk that the TAO 
member imposes his idea of a unique 
reservoir (instead of multiple weirs). 
 
